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Is Contract Farming More Profitable and Efficient Than Non-Contract FarmingÑ 
A Survey Study of Rice Farms In Taiwan 
 
Abstract  
Trade liberalization and globalization has modernized the food retail sector in 
Taiwan, affecting consumers, producers and trade patterns.    These changes have placed 
significant pressures on farmers and processors including more stringent quality control and 
product varieties.    The government has launched a rice production-marketing contract 
program in 2005 to assist rice farmers and the agro-business sector to work together as 
partners.    The minimum scale for each contract is 50 hectares of adjacent rice paddies with 
50 participants including rice farmers, seedling providers, millers and marketing agents.   
In order to evaluate the outcome of this program, a survey is conducted in the summer of 
2005 after the first (spring) crop is harvested.    Information of price and value of output 
and major variable and fixed inputs are collected along with characteristics of the farmers 
and farms.    The survey results show that the average revenue of a contract farm is about 
11 percent higher than an average non-contract farm.    The per hectare cost of production 
in a contract farm is about 13 percent lower and as a result the average profit margin under 
contract is more than 50 percent above those without contract.    A swtiching regression 
profit frontier model is adopted to further investigate their efficiency performance.    The 
result indicates that an average contract farms is 20 percent more efficient than an average 
non-contract farm in a comparable operating environment.    The results also suggests that 
although contract farming has potential to improve the profit of smallholders, it is not a 
sufficient condition for such improvement.  
 
2
Is Contract Farming More Profitable and Efficient Than Non-Contract FarmingÑ 
A Survey Study of Rice Farms In Taiwan 
I.  Introduction 
Contract farming has been proposed as an avenue for private sector to take over the 
roles previously served by the government in the provision of information, inputs or credit 
for small-scale farmers in the developing countries (World Bank, 2001).   Increasing atten-
tion has been given to whether contract farming can provide small farmers with improved 
income or sufficient protection from incurring losses due to price fluctuations.   Rice 
production in Taiwan is largely based on small family holdings with an average size of one 
hectare per farm for more than 30 years.    Farmers learn to gain production and scale 
efficiencies by organizing custom farming teams to work for those who do not own 
machineries (Fujiki, 1999).    Most rice farmers are independent producers, who sell their 
products individually and have little bargaining power with input suppliers and produce 
markets.  
Over the years, the government guaranteed procurement at a support price 20 
percent above the average production costs has increased rice production and created 
imbalances in the supply and demand in the rice market.    The government procurement 
scheme has also served as a major vehicle to stabilize rice price which is three times the 
world level as well as farmers´ income.    Importation of rice is banned to provide extra 
protection for the domestic high-cost producers.    However, after formally joining the 
WTO in January 2002, Taiwan began to open up its market to imports of rice.    A total of 
144,000 metric tons of rice are imported annually under the quota system, which is 
equivalent to about 8 percent of annual  consumption.  
 
3
Both rice farmers and marketing chain have been brought to the crossroad and must 
undertake fundamental changes.    However, the present rice marketing system has failed to 
provide a conducive environment due to the insufficient forward and backward linkages 
after a long history of government protection.  Farmers suffer income losses from price 
fluctuations because any slight increase(decrease) in rice production leads to a price 
crash(boom).  On the other side of the market, trade liberalization and globalization has 
also modernized the food retail sector in Taiwan, affecting consumers, producers and trade 
patterns.  Consumers have been willing to pay for more variety and higher quality foods 
and increased value-added services.  These changes have placed additional pressures on 
farmers and processors including more stringent quality control and product varietiy.   
To overcome such bottleneck, the government has launched a rice 
production-marketing contract program in 2005 to assist rice farmers and the agro-business 
sector to work together as partners toward prosperity.    The minimum scale for each 
contract is 50 hectares of adjacent rice paddies with 50 participants including rice farmers, 
seedling providers, millers and marketing agents.    Locally-adapted improved seedling and 
low-input technologies are provided to the rice farmers and millers under the contract 
program supervised by the local extension services and food agencies.  The  participating 
farmers have to adopt the production traceability and book-keeping system and agree not to 
sell their product to other buyers including the government.    Contract farming can be 
particularly beneficial for rice farmers to acquire new technical and managerial know-how 
and for agro-industry to meet consumers´ demand for quality and safe products.   
In order to evaluate the outcome of this program, a survey is conducted in the 
summer of 2005 after the first (spring) crop is harvested.    Information of price and value  
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of output and major variable and fixed inputs are collected along with characteristics of the 
farmers and farms.    The survey covers 80 contract farmers in 7 provinces producing 
different varieties of rice throughout the major production districts.    For comparison 
purposes, 246 non-contract farmers are also interviewed in the same or nearby villages 
within the same province and other adjacent provinces.    The distribution of farm size is 
quite similar with an average of 2.09 and 2.00 hectares for the contact and non-contract 
farms respectively.    The survey results show that the average revenue is NT$145,000 per 
hectare on a contract farm, which is about 11 percent higher than an average non-contract 
farm.    The per hectare cost of production in a contract farm is about 13 percent lower than 
the con-contract farm.    As a result, the average profit margin under contract is more than 
50 percent above those without contract.    A stochastic profit frontier model will be 
adopted to further investigate the efficiency performance and its determinants for both 
contract and non-contract farms.      The result will also be used to test the hypothesis that 
contract farms are more efficient than non-contract farms in a comparable operational and 
technological environment.    Policy recommendations on whether contract farming can 
indeed be a new and an effective institutional reform mechanism to increase profitability 
for small-scale family farms will be drawn. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows.    The next section describes the 
survey design followed by a brief description of the sample data and empirical model.   
Section four presents the empirical results and the final section concludes. 
II. Survey Design and Sample Characteristics 
This section illustrates the survey design and the characteristics of the sample. Both 
contract and non-contract farms are  interviewed.    The choice of survey sites  
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was based on the official record of the contracts.    Geographical dispersions are also taken 
into consideration because the rice variety is affected by the climate and local production 
environment.    For example, Taigon No 9 and Tainon No 71 are widely adopted varieties in 
the northern and central regions, while Taigon No. 2 and Kaoshung No 139 are more popu-
lar in the southern and eastern regions.    To enhance the sample’s representative, a strati-
fied sampling procedure is adopted.    First, the sample size in each township is determined 
in proportion to the hectares under contract.    Then, the sample farm is randomly drawn 
from the contract listing provided by the rice millers who offer the contract.    The 
non-contract farms from the sample province or nearby provinces are selected in proportion 
to the planting hectares from the list provided by the extension specialists of the township 
Farmer’s Associations.    Table 1 lists the sample distribution by province and township.   
The numbers of contract and non-contract farms interviewed are 80 and 246, respectively.   
Ten farms were interviewed for the questionnaire pretest purposes followed by a formal 
on-site survey conducted in July 2005.     
Questions regarding previous planting experiences, rice variety, contract prices, pro-
duction costs, and demographic factors are addressed in the questionnaire.  Demographic 
factors included socio-economic data, household size and off-farm income.    Table 2 illus-
trates the socio-economic characteristics of the household heads of the sample farms.    For 
the contract farms, most of the household heads are 50 years old males, had a elemen-
tary-level education and have no off-farm jobs.  The non-contract farm household heads 
have similar characteristics except a much higher off-farm job participation rate.  Overall 
speaking, household heads for contract farms are younger and more specialized in rice 
farming than non-contract farms.  
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Table 3 compares the average revenue and production cost of contract and 
non-contract farms in each region on per hectare basis.    First, the average revenues of 
contract farms are higher than those of non-contract farms in most regions except the 
southern region.    The output per hectare is about the same.    Therefore, the major reason 
of higher revenue is due to higher rice quality.    Most of the contract farms receive higher 
prices except those in the southern region.      A flooding event in 2005 damaged the first 
crops in many agricultural provinces in the southern region.    However, these contract 
farms still outperform the non-contract farms by higher yields per hectare.    So despite the 
flooding damage, the total revenues are still better than the non-contract ones.         
Next, the contract farms spend more on their seeds due to variety differences.    How-
ever, due to strict restriction on fertilizer and chemical usages, these contract farms spend 
much less on the chemical expenditures.      Therefore, on average the total expenditure n of 
contract farms is 20 percent lower than those of non-contract farms.    The gross and net 
revenues of contract farms are higher than the non-contract farms for all regions.    The 
profit margins on the gross basis range from NT$6,000 in the north up to NT$60,000 in the 
east.    On the net basis, the profit margin of entering the contract arrangement is about 
NT$40,000 in the central region and NT$60,000 for those located the southern and eastern 
regions.    The net revenues of the farms in the northern region have the smallest margin or 
no benefit at all from the contract.   
III. Empirical Model 
A rice farmer’s decision on whether to sign up a production-marketing contract is a 
self-selection problem and such a problem can be described by a switching regression 
model and a criterion function (Lee, 1978;  Huang et al., 2002).    Suppose the i
th rice  
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farmer has two choices, joining or not joining a contract, and this decision is determined by 
the following profit functions,  C π  and  N π , for contract and non-contract farmers respec-
tively: 
           i C C i C i C X ε β π + = ,                           ( 1 )  
    i N N i N i N X ε β π + = ,                           ( 2 )  
where  i C X  and  i N X   are the vectors of profit determinants of contract options while  i C ε  
and  i N ε   are stochastic error terms with zero means and the variances 
2
C σ  and 
2
N σ , re-
spectively.    The farmers’ decision on joining or not this contract depends on the profit dif-
ferential between contract and non-contract and other non-profit considerations and can be 
described by a criterion function as follows: 
   i i N i C i Z ε π π γ α + − + = ) ( I
*
i        (3) 
where  i Z  is a vector of non-profit variables while the random variable  i ε  represents the 
unobservable factors that affect the selection of joining a contract.   The criterion function in 
equation (3) indicates that a rice farmer may join the contract if the profit from joining the 
contract is higher than the profit without the contract.  Since the farmer can only choose 
either to sign a contract or to stay independent, only one of the two profits ( i C X  or  i N X ) 
can be observed.  Therefore, the dependent variable  0
* > i I  if the profit of joining con-
tract is observed or 0
* ≤ i I   when the profit of non-joining contract is found.     
Equations (1) to (3) cannot be estimated directly because the decision to contract may 
be determined by unobserved variables (e.g., farmers’ characteristics, management ability) 
that may also affect performance.    Therefore, the error terms in (1)~(3) will be correlated.    
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A standard two-stage procedure of Lee (1978) and Willis and Rosen (1979) is adopted to 
allow unbiased estimation.    Suppose two inverse Mills ratios  i C W  and  i N W  derived 
from equation (3) are applied into equations (1) and (2) as follows: 
i C i C C C i C i C W X ε δ β π + + =    for  1 = i I ,   a n d              ( 4 )  
i N i N N N i N i N W X ε δ β π + + =    for  0 = i I             ( 5 )  
In the empirical procedure, the two inverse Mills ratios are estimated from equation (3) 





, are incorporated into equations (4) and (5) to correct the sample selection bias and to 
obtain the unbiased estimators for ( N C N C
^ ^ ^ ^
, , , δ δ β β ) using least square methods. 
To estimate the inefficiency for non-contract rice farmers, the first step is to calculate 
the residual from equation (5) where the residual is calculated as: 
) (
^ ^ ^
i N i N i N N N N i N i N i N E u v W X e ε δ β π − + = − − =                        ( 6 )  
Following the study by Huang et al. (2002) on the definition of efficiency, the 
max
i N π  is  de-
noted as the maximized profit of non-contract rice farmers.    So the deviation of profit 
i N π   from the frontier, 
max
i N π - i N π , is a composite error ( i N ε ) that consists of a symmetric, 
two-sided error,  i N v , and a one-sided component,  i N u .  Suppose  i N v   is a normally dis-
tributed function with mean 0 and variance 
2
v σ  while  i N u   is normally truncated at a dis-
tribution function with mean 0 and variance 
2
u σ .  The  estimated  variances  of 
2
v σ  and 
2
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where  2 m  and  3 m   are the second and third moments of the residual  i N e . 
The profit inefficiency for a non-contract farmer can be estimated following Battese 
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IV.  Estimation Results 
The data in this study were taken from the survey described in Section 2 during a pe-
riod of July to September in 2005.   After deleting the samples with missing observations, 
the empirical estimation is based on 201 non-contract sample farms and 80 contract sample 
farms.    Table 4 summarizes the sample statistics for both contract and non-contract farms.   
The average planting acreage of the contract farm is 2.21 hectare, which is slightly higher 
than the average of non-contract farms 1.73 hectare. 
The average age of contract farms’ household heads is only 43 years old.  This is 
much younger than the 60 years old of the non-contract household heads.    The percentage 
of full time contract farm household heads is 70%, which is higher than the 52 % of the 
non-contract farms.  The percentage of farmers receiving high school or above education 
is also higher than those of non-contract farms.  This suggests that contact farmers  
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tend to have more years of education than the non-contract farmers. 
  As for production costs, Table 4 shows that chemical and machine costs for rice 
contract farmers are less than non-contract farmers while there is no significant difference 
in seed cost.  The profit of contract is on average 27% higher than without joining con-
tract. 
  The empirical model for estimating the decision to join the contract versus to prod-
uct independently is specified as follow: 
i i i i i i i REG REVENUE FULL EDU AGE I ε γ γ γ γ γ γ + + + + + + = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 5 4 3 2 1 0 ,    (9) 
where  1 = i I  if a latent profit margin from joining the contract is positive while it is 0 
otherwise. 
  The estimation results for equation (9) are shown in Table 5.  Table 5 shows that 
having a primary occupation on-farm raises the likelihood of contracting.  This is consis-
tent with our expectations.  However, increases in years of age and education lower the 
probability that farmer will join the contract.  Older rice farmers would less likely to join 
the contract probably because of the habit formation effect.  They are reluctant to change 
unless necessary.  More educated farmers may also have a higher income and thus a 
higher reservation wage to be induced into contract production.    Table 5 also suggests that 
farmers in the eastern region are more likely to accept a contract because these farmers 
could earn more than could farmers in other regions. 
  The empirical model for estimating the impact of contract production on farm’s 
profit performance taking into account the selection process are denoted as follows:  
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+ + + + =
 (10) 
where subscript i= c for contract farms and i=nc for con-contract farms.     
The estimation results for equations (10) are shown in Table 6 with the selectivity 
bias adjusted.    First, the farm size (ACRE) has positive and significant impact on the profit 
of contract farms, but all other inputs like seed, chemical and labor have no significant im-
pact except when they are interacted with the farm size.    This result suggests that the 
profit of contract farming is highly correlated with the acreage devoted to the contract.     
This is expected because the contract usually requires farmers to comply with certain input 
allocation restrictions.    Thus farmers lose control over their management decisions and the 
linkage of profit and input usage no longer exists.    The other implication is that larger 
farms benefit more than the smaller ones once they join the contract.    The results for 
non-contract farms are quite different in that inputs other than acreage are the major deter-
minants of the profit.    Thus the autonomy of input allocations is preserved by the 
non-contract  farmers.    
As for the non-profit determinants, both location and employment status play a sig-
nificant role in the profit.    Farms located in the eastern region has higher profits than those 
located in other regions, however it is only statistically significant for those under the con-
tract arrangement.    Part-time contract farmers earn higher profits than their full-time peers.   
Thus, although full-time farmers have larger probability to participate contract farming, 
they may not be better off than those par-time contract farmers.    This may reflect a trade- 
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off between profit gain and loss of autonomy by the contract.    However, the case for 
non-contract farms is opposite.    Full-time farmers enjoy higher profits than their part-time 
peers because there is no loss of managerial control when farmers produce independently.   
Because the scale of production has a strong positive correlation with the likelihood 
of contracting, we also add an interaction term of sample selection and scale (i.e., 
Wi*ACRE) when the two mill’s ratios (Wi ) are added into the model.    The coefficients of 
the selectivity bias adjustment (Wi ) are both significant but have the opposite signs with 
84 . 0 1 − = c δ  and  48 . 0 1 = nc δ .    This result implies that those who choose to join the con-
tract are worse than the average contract farmers in terms of profit earnings.    Those who 
choose to produce independently are better than the average independent farmers.      The 
positive and significant  8 2 . 0 2 = c δ   implies that larger farm size is associated with an in-
creasing profit for contract farms.     
Finally, Table 7 shows the estimates of profit margins of non-contact farms over 
contract farms and the measurement of profit in-efficiency of the non-contract farms for the 
entire sample and for subgroups by farm size, by full-time versus part-time, and by location. 
As sown in Table 7, for the sample as a whole there is about 20 percent profit efficiency in 
contract rice farming.      There is no significant variation in inefficiency by farm scale, by 
full-time versus part-time, or by location.      Older farmers tend to be more in-efficient 
when they produce independently.    Joining the contract may help them gain efficiency in 
profit earnings.   
V.  Concluding Remark 
      Contract farming has become an attractive policy instrument for many develop-
ing countries to assist small farmers to gain  access to markets, information, credits, and  
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necessary services to manage their risk.    On the other hand, contract farming may have 
subtle impacts on both farmers’ income and managerial control.    Therefore, the success or 
effectiveness of this policy instrument depends on whether these contracts are attractive 
enough for the farmers by increase their profits while loss of autonomy can be minimized.   
In this paper, we conduct an on-farm survey on more than 300 rice farmers in Taiwan.   
The per hectare cost of production in a contract farm is about 13 percent lower and as a 
result the average profit margin under contract is more than 50 percent above those without 
contract.   
Next, a switching regression model is adopted to analyze farmers’ decision on con-
tract participation and profit performance.    The estimation result indicates that an average 
contract farms is 20 percent more efficient than an average non-contract farm in a 
comparable operating environment.    These results imply that contract arrangement can 
indeed be an effective institutional reform mechanism to increase profitability and 
competitiveness for small-scale family farms.    We also find that the contract decision is 
determined not only by a profit comparison between contract and independent production 
but also by other demographic determinants like age, education level, employment status 
and geographical locations. 
Finally, we find that none of the inputs except land size is significant factor deter-
mining the profit.    Larger farms tend to benefit more from the contract.    Therefore, al-
though contract farming has potential to improve the profit of smallholders, it is not a suffi-
cient condition for such improvement.    Small farmers can be excluded from contracts 
partly because they cannot take advantages in profit earnings and partly because they can 
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Table 1.    Sample Size and Geographical Distribution 
Region Province Township  Contract  farm Non-contract  farms 
North Taoyuan Shinwu  13(5.3%)
 Miaoli  Yuanli  6(7.5%) 9(3.7%)
     Sub-total  6(7.5%) 22(8.9%)
Central Taichung  Taichia  19(7.7%)
   Wufeng  5(6.3%) 12(4.9%)
 Chunghwa  Fushing  16(6.5%)
   Pitou  12(15%) 15(6.1%)
   Erlin  9(11.3%)
   Hermei  15(6.1%)
     Sub-total 26(32.5%) 77(31.3%)
South Yunlin  Tsutung  3((3.8%) 14(5.7%)
 Chiayi  Taibao  13(5.3%)
   Shinkung  13(5.3%)
   Minshung  12(4.9%)
 Tainan  Hobin  15(6.1%)
   Shenghua  16(6.5%)
   Shiayin  6(7.5%)
   Baihe  5(6.3%)
 Kaoshung  Daliao  12(4.9%)
 Pintung  Wondan  13(5.3%)
     Sub-total 14(17.5%) 108(43.9%)
East Yilang Jiaoshi  13(5.3%)
 Hualian  Fuli  6(7.5%) 16(6.5%)
 Taitung  Kuanshan  11(13.8%) 7(2.8%)
   Tsushung  17(21.3%) 3(1.2%)
     Sub-total 34(42.5%) 39(15.9%)









Number of Sample  Percentage in Total (%) 
 
Contract Non-contract Contract Non-contract
Gender      
Male 76 236 95.00  98.74
Female 4 3 5.00  1.26
Age      
Below 30  1 0 1.25  0.00
31~40 5 10 6.25  4.25
41~50 11 37 13.75  15.75
51~64 34 106 42.5  45.11
65 and above  29 82 36.25  34.89
Education      
None 9 8 11.25  4.19
Elementary 39 87 48.75  45.55
Middle school  13 46 16.25  24.08
High school  15 41 18.75  17.15
Vocational college  3 8 3.75  3.34
College and above  1 1 1.25  0.41
No. in farming      
1 31 69 38.75  28.87
2 37 131 46.25  54.81
3 8 28 10.00  11.72
4 and more  4 11 5.00  4.60
Type      
Full-time 56 136 70.00  55.28
Part-time 24 110 30.00  44.72 
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Table 3.    Revenues and Production Cost of Sample Farm by Region 
Unit: Kg/Hectare; NT$/Hectare 





















Revenue  116,492    109,732    141,697 114,648 121,996 115,646 148,153   85,735    145,289 105,183 
Production  7,789   7,625   7,393  7,729  9,550  7,706  6,379   5,887   7,074  7,143 
Price  15.0   14.4   19.2  14.8  12.8  15.0  23.2   14.6   20.5  14.7 
Total Cost    97,791   91,152    107,337 109,452  84,520 142,934  90,089   96,077   94,062 112,460 
Direct  59,608   59,006   66,884  71,864  62,960 107,599  54,598   50,288   60,692  72,909 
Seed  8,516   7,909   8,364  7,941  8,652  8,213  7,224   5,578   7,932  7,192 
Pesticide  871   6,010   6,787  9,796  9,413 12,220  6,247   4,666   6,794  8,505 
Fertilizer  12,514   13,902   11,971  9,683  9,627  11,678  9,287    8,281   10,347  9,863 
Material  0    0   2,060  3,459  0 12,419  0   3,451   1,539  6,372 
Custom  31,343   29,483   29,777  29,443  25,634  37,539  25,805   16,833   27,323  26,325 
Hire labor  3,966    0   5,286  8,446  3,727 14,943  3,385    11,479   3,562 10,340 
Energy  2,398   1,701   2,639  3,095  5,907 10,587  2,651   2,812   3,196  4,312 
Indirect  38,183   32,146   40,453  37,588  21,560  35,334  35,491   45,789   33,370  39,551 
   Self-wage  16,696   16,696   21,376  20,987  11,800  14,734  21,484   18,848   18,892  19,298 
   Land  rent  21,487   15,450   19,077  16,601  9,760  20,600  14,007   26,941   14,478  20,253 
Gross Profit  56,884   50,726   74,813  42,785  59,036  8,047  93,556   35,447   84,596  32,274 
Net Profit  18,701   18,580   34,360  5,196  37,476 -27,287  58,065   -10,342   51,227  -7,277 
 
 
Table 4. Sample Statistics: Means and Standard Deviation 
 
Variables  Non-Contract Farms  Contract Farms 








Education (%)  19.90%  23.75% 
Full Time (%)  52.06%  70.00% 




















Note: The numbers in the parenthesis represent the standard deviations Đ. 
Education is the percentage of sample with education higher than high school level.   




Table 5. Probit Estimation of the Sample Selection Model 
 











Region Dummy  1.586** 
(0.686) 
McFadden R-Square  0.7313 
LR Statistic  120.48 
Note: Region Dummy variable is defined as 1 if the region is located East Taiwan while it 
is zero for other regions. 
The numbers in the parenthesis are standard errors. 




Table 6. Estimation Profit Functions for Contract and Non-Contract Rice Farmers 
 





































































Adjusted R-Square  0.974  0.942 
Note: The profit function is a translog function which means we take logarithm on both the 





Table 7. Profit in-efficiency of Non-contract Farms 
 
 Non-Contract 
All Farmers  0.8110 
Full-Time Farmers  0.8117 
Part-Time Farmers  0.8104 
  
Large Scale  0.8118 
Small Scale  0.8107 
  
Older Farmers  0.8060 
Young Farmers  0.8178 
  
East Region  0.8117 
Non-East Region  0.8100 
 
 
 